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Abstract 
This paper intended to examine the relationship between capital and risk of Tanzanian commercial banks during 
the period 2009-2014 using the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) method of estimation. The empirical findings 
reveal a direct relationship between capital ratios and bank risk-taking behavior implying that as the level of 
banks’ risk increases bank managers tend to increase the bank capital ratios so as to prevent banks from violating 
the regulatory minimum capital requirements.The study also found a positive relationship between regulatory 
pressure and capital. This positive impact shows that Tanzanians large commercial banks approaching the 
minimum capital requirements are inclined to improve their capital base in order to circumvent the penalties 
resulted from infringing  the legal requirements of keeping minimum capital ratio.The study further shows  a 
positive and significant association between profitability and bank capital implying that that as the profitability 
of banks increases they retain more earnings to raise the level of their capital. Hence, it is concluded that 
improvement in profitability helps banks to increase their capital ratios and prevent them from penalty associated 
with failure to meet minimum capital requirements.  
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1. Introduction 
Most studies focus on banks when considering the financial stability of the country because of a critical role 
banks play in providing financing services in economy as well as acting as the payment channel to businesses 
and economy at large, (George, 1994). On top of that, central banks use commercial banks and other financial 
institutions as a mechanism to transmit the changes in monetary policy to the real sector economy (George, 
1994). Capital adequacy is considered as a stepping stone towards financial stability .Financial stability is said to 
be potentially disrupted by activities of non-banking activities when the relationship between banking activities 
and other parts of the financial sector is highly increasing as insisted by George, (1994). 
In the modern banking regulation the minimum capital requirements play a very important role. The 
banking industry worldwide has witnessed   implementation of the so-called Basle Accord that sets minimum 
capital standards for internationally active banks. During the 1970’s and 1980’s there existed several challenge 
posed by momentous declines in the banks’ capital ratios resulted into bank insolvencies and ultimately failures. 
Following this, bank regulators have put their attention on the minimum bank capital requirements in order to 
boost the financial system stability. A crucial step in that direction was the 1988 Basel Capital Accord which was 
the agreement for banks among G-10 countries on minimum risk-based capital requirements of 8% to total assets. 
(BIS, Implementation of Basel II, 2004, www.bis.org) 
Basel II came into existence in 2006 as a solution to weaknesses shown by Basel I and to further 
advance the regulatory capital requirements. The emergence  of global down turn of 2007-2009 raised questions 
on the  effectiveness of Basel I and II capital regulations because it is during the similar period of their 
introduction that banks suffered weak capitalization. It then followed Basel III was introduced in 2010 to rectify 
the shortcomings of Basel I and II.  
The purpose of capital regulation is to make sure banks keep level of their capital proportional to their 
risk exposure profile. Nevertheless, if this matching of risk profile and capital level is not carefully designed the 
bank may be in a questionable financial soundness and ultimately failure. This may be a result of what is called 
moral hazard and asymmetry of information which gives rooms for bank managers to take excessive bank risks 
as previously advocated by Kahane (1977); Koehn and Santomero (1980);  
In an attempt to reinforce the banking sector and extend the financial sector, as a whole, BOT set a 
relatively higher minimum regulatory capital ratio compared to the one stated in the Basel (I-III) which is 8% for 
total capital and tier-1 capital 4.5% and tier-2 capital 6%. Apparently, in Tanzania according to Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act (2014) a bank or any financial institution at any time has to maintain; 
a) Core capital of not less than twelve and one half per cent of its total risk-weighted assets and off balance 
sheet exposure; and  
b) Total capital of not less than fourteen and one half per cent of its total risk weighted assets and off balance 
sheet exposure 
Together with all the efforts to restructure and rewrite banking regulations, in response to the recent 
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global financial crisis, there is quite a serious challenge in implementation of such regulations because each 
country’s national policies are different and bank capital could have different effects on bank risk-taking. 
According to Ben Bouheni, (2013) this could be due to different financial and institutional environments in 
which the banks’ operations are subjected. This has, therefore, attracted many scholars to consider this as a hot 
topic not.  
The literature shows mixed results on the capital –risk nexus and that most studies are conducted on 
U.S. and European banks. For example González (2004), Klomp and Haan (2012), and Furlong and Keeley 
(1989) concentrated on U.S. banks and found a negative relationship between risk and capital while Rime (2001 
focused on European banks and found a positive relationship. The literature also has covered some Asian banks; 
for example Klomp and Haan (2012) dealt with Japanese banks, Zhang et al. (2008) on Chinese banks Afzal and 
Laeven and Levine (2008), González (2004), Hussain and Hassan (2005) and results are still mixed . There are 
few studies from African banks and more specifically Tanzania on the relationship between risk-taking and 
capital.  The intention of this study is to undertake an empirical analysis of Tanzania large commercial banks’ 
risk taking behavior in  its association with capital while observing the regulatory capital minimum requirements.  
 
2. Related Literature  
2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings  
2.1.1 The capital buffer theory 
During their operations, most banks maintain levels of capital ratios above what is set by the regulatory 
authorities as minimum capital requirement. In this case banks will always strive to increase their capital ratios 
when they come closer to the minimum regulatory capital ratio. According to Kjersti-Gro Lindquist, (2003) this 
excess capital is known as buffer capital which is the absolute difference between actual capital ratio and 
regulatory minimum capital requirement  
The buffer theory manifested by Milne and Whalley (2002) envisages that due to a worry to incur costs 
associated with the violation of capital requirements bank approaching the regulatory minimum capital ratio may 
increase capital and reduce risk .In the Netherlands, currents banks’ capital ratios have an average of a little more 
than 12%. Because this percentage is lying well above the minimum regulatory capital of 8 percent, an average 
Dutch bank also holds a capital buffer on top of the regulatory minimum. 
According to Milne and Whalley (2002) several reasons are associated with banks holding excess 
capital; first the buffer as insurance, when a bank with poor capitalization becomes in situation of loosing public 
confidence and reputation this buffer may be used as insurance against cost of unexpected loan losses (due to 
purely random shocks or asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower) and that of raising new 
additional capital. On the other hand such banks may be encouraged to take more risk hoping to boost their 
reputations through expected higher expected rate of return otherwise shareholders may hesitate issue new 
capital to banks which may use the new capital to set creditors obligations hence the expected return may be 
their rescue in the eyes of capital providers., second, because having buffer capital is connected with the banks’ 
assets risk profile the buffer capital in excess of  the regulatory minimum robustly dictates bank’s risk taking 
behavior On regulators, side  banks with a relatively risky portfolio would prefer to hold a relatively high level 
of excess capital over minimum requirements than a lower level otherwise they are more likely record capital 
ratios below the minimum capital ratio;  third as holding a buffer capital is considered by banks as the 
competition effect a bank may use excess capital to signify its financial health hence probability of nion-
failure.Therefore buffer capital may be used as a mechanism of rescuing banks from failure due competition for 
unsecured deposits and money market funding. This is why most banks are very careful about the size of their 
own capital buffer relative to those of their competitors. According to Berger et al. (1995) banks may hold 
excess capital so as to be able to explore unexpected investment opportunities. 
2.1.2. Moral Hazards Theory 
Jokipii and Milne, (2008) acknowledge the regulation of the bank’s capital as one of the crucial instruments of 
modern banking regulations. The regulation intends to create a cushion during economic down turns and a 
method to hold back banks from taking unwarranted risk. During an economic fall back, banks’ asset quality 
falls resulting into capital fall. It should be clear that theoretical foundation on the relationship between capital 
and risk is mainly based on the theory of moral hazard that existed due to the emergence of agency problem. 
Jokipii and Milne, (2008) tested whether increased capital regulation encourages banks to increase their risks or 
the other way around.  
 
3. Empirical Review 
For quite sometimes now the research in banking sector has concentrated on the relationship that exist between 
the bank capital and their behaviors on risk taking. In this section the paper briefly reviews the literature 
surrounding this area. Regarding the effect of higher regulatory capital requirements on bank risk-taking 
behavior there is no conclusive results at the moment in the extant literature. For example, Koehn and Santomero 
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(1980) studied the interplay between higher capital regulation and banks’ risk using variance model and found 
that that capital ratio regulation is ineffective in controlling banks’ insolvency risk. They proposed the use of risk 
weights under the risk-based capital as a solution to the insolvency problem. 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) undertook a theoretical examination of the impact of capital regulation bank 
risk taking behavior and found an inverse relationship implying that higher capital requirements reduces the bank 
managers’ incentives to increase the risk of the bank assets .In essence high rigid capital regulation diminishes 
the liability of deposit insurance system until there is an effort in place to contain asset risk. The authors also 
found that higher capital requirement is only possible for those banks which maximize their values by raising 
more capital. 
In a dynamic theoretical model, Blum (1999) assessed whether risk-based capital requirements reduce 
bank risk-taking and came up with a conclusion that higher capital requirements reduce risk only when it is a 
extremely expensive to raise capital. The author also shows that introduction of capital adequacy rules may not 
be an attractive good idea if the regulators are interested to decrease banks’ insolvency risk. 
A study by Calem and Rob (1999) on the impact of regulatory capital requirements on risk-taking 
behavior of banks revealed a U-shaped relationship between bank capital and risk-taking showing that when 
banks raise their capital levels they first take lower risk, and then higher risk. The study shows that 
undercapitalized banks take more risk due to extra deposit insurance premium. In their study, the authors found 
that as the capital requirement increases risk taken by well-capitalized banks also increases 
Using Switzerland banks data Rime (2001) examined the impact of regulatory capital requirements on 
bank risk-taking behavior and results show that Swiss banks increased their capital due to regulatory pressure. 
They also report insignificant relationship between regulatory pressure and risk. This may mean that banks 
whose capital ratio falls below minimum capital requirements often wish to raise their capital adequacy ratio. 
The author concludes that changes in capital ratios and corresponding changes in risk are directly related and 
they also observed that bank size has significant inverse relationship with capital. 
In analyzing relationship among capital requirements, market power and risk, Repullo (2002) utilized a 
dynamic model of imperfect competition and found that the franchise values of banks depend on the margin of 
intermediations; that is if the franchise value is small the margin is also small and vice versa. The author also 
reported that, in a competitive banking market, capital requirements are effective in limiting bank risk-taking  
Using a sample of 36 countries comprised of 251 banks   González (2004) examined the effect of bank 
regulation on bank risk-taking and charter values. The results of the study revealed a negative relationship 
between stability of banking system and regulatory restrictions that means stringent regulatory restrictions 
decrease bank charter values and encourage banks to take more risk. They also report that in countries with 
deposit insurance bank charter values are on higher side.  
Another countrywide study by Hussain and Hassan (2005), using 11 developing countries, which 
examined the impact of capital requirements on credit risk-taking, found that capital requirement regulations 
don’t have any impact on increasing bank capital ratios in developing countries. In developing countries factors 
which matter more in designing and implementing capital regulations include the environmental, cultural, 
business and legal issues.  
Furthermore, using a sample of 200 banks from OECD, Klomp and Haan (2012) used 200 banks from 
OECD countries to analyse the impact of bank regulation on risk-taking behavior and the empirical evidence of 
the study show that bank supervision and regulation has strong impact on risk-taking decisions of high-risk 
banks but insignificant impact for banks with low risk profile. 
A study by Zhang et al. (2008) on Chinese commercial banks analysed the impact of capital regulation 
on bank risk-taking using GMM dynamic estimator and found a significant inverse relation between capital 
change and risk change implying that increment in capital ratio was effective to limit commercial banks risk by 
putting in place adequacy regulation. They also concluded that bank size has a positive effect on changes in 
capital.  
Laeven and Levine (2008) empirically studied the theories of bank ownership structures, bank industry 
regulations and bank risk taking. Particularly, they concentrated between owners- managers agency problem 
over bank risk-taking decisions. Their study found that major owner’s control rights and bank risk-taking are 
positively related  implying that  bank risk-taking goes parallel with control rights of main shareholders. The 
findings also show that bank risk-taking is also dependent on banks’ corporate governance structure. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data used in this paper are collected from the respective banks’ published quarterly financial reports for the 
period under study (2009-2014). Our sample includes all 8 large commercial banks operating in Tanzanian 
banking sector as categorized by EY (2015) based on their capital levels. These banks include Barclays, Citibank, 
CRDB, Exim, NBC, NMB, Stan Chart and Stanbic. Such banks dominate the financial services and control over 
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75% of the market shares as reported in survey done by Serengeti Advisors (2015). 
 
4.2 Model Specification and Variable Definition 
The paper primarily aims at examining the reaction of Tanzanian commercial banks to regulatory pressure of 
decision related to capital and risk. We apply simultaneous equation model, a version developed by Shrieves and 
Dahl (2003). Since the bank capital and risk are usually correlated  ( they are endogenous)and are explanatory 
variables to each other in their respective equations, we  apply a two-stage least squares regression analysis 
(2SLS) assuming that banks make decisions related to capital and risk simultaneously. A central aspect of this 
methodology is that it recognizes that changes in both capital and risk have endogenous and exogenous 
components.  
Before applying either OLS or 2SLS we test the endorgeinity of capital and risk using Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test. 
In this study we estimate the following systems of simultaneous equations 
1. Capital Equation 
CARit = a0 + a1*BSZit + a2*ROAit + a3*ROEit + a4*PRESit + a5*CRSKit + a6*INFLit + a7*GDPit +e1it 
2. Risk Equation 
CRSKit = b0 +b1*BSZit + b2*ROAit + b3*ROEit + b4*PRESit + b5*CARit + a6*INFLit + a7*GDPit +e1it 
Where;  
CAR=Capital Adequacy; the share of equity on total assets of the bank. Capital Adequacy shows the strength of 
bank capital against the vagaries of economic and financial environment  
BSZ (Size of the bank): logarithm of total assets of the bank. Size can show the economies of scale. ROA 
(Profitability): Returns on Assets; this is the ratio of net profit before tax to total asset. ROA depicts how the 
bank uses its assets to generate profits  
ROE (Profitability) = Returns on Equity 
CRSK= Credit Risk; measured as the ratio of net loans to total assets  
PRES= Regulatory Pressure; Measured as the dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the bank’s capital 
ratio is within the minimum required capital requirement and 0 otherwise as depicted by Rime (2001). In 
Tanzania according to Banking and Financial Institutions Act (2014) a bank or any financial institution at any 
time has to maintain; 
c) Core capital of not less than twelve and one half per cent of its total risk-weighted assets and off balance 
sheet exposure; and  
d) Total capital of not less than fourteen and one half per cent of its total risk weighted assets and off balance 
sheet exposure 
The variables used in this study are summarized in table 1 below 
Table 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
Variable Definition Adapted From 
ROA-Returns on 
Assets 
Net profit before tax to total asset Chin, (2011); Naceur, 2003; 
Ongore and Kusa, (2013)). 
Bank size (BSZ) The natural logarithm of total assets Boyd et al, (2009). 
ROE-Returns on 
Equity 
Net profit after tax to owners’ equity Khrawish, (2011); 
Regulatory 
pressure (Pres): 
Dummy variable, which takes 1 if the bank’s 
capital ratio is 12.5% , and zero otherwise 
Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act (2014) 
Capital Adequacy Equity-to-total assets  Gul, (2011) 
Credit risk Net loans to total assets Gul, (2011) 
 
5. Empirical Findings and Discussions 
This part of the paper reports the empirical results obtained from this study from the simultaneous equation 
framework specified in the methodology part where capital is an endogenous variable in risk equation while risk 
is an endogenous variable in capital equation. The 2SLS estimation has been applied to take care of the 
endogeneity problem. In this study, the balanced panel model has been utilized.  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics is presented in the table 2 below. It can be observed from table 2 below that average 
bank capital is 12.6% with minimum of 23.7% and minimum value of 8.9%. This shows that the average bank 
capital in the sample of larger commercial banks in Tanzania is within the capital requirement level of 12.5% set 
by BOT although the minimum value is below the regulatory requirements. However, the capital ratio in 
Tanzanian large commercial banks is well above the minimum regulatory capital stipulated in Basel I-III. 
Average bank credit risk is roughly 48% with maximum of 71% and minimum of about 18%. Average 
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profitability measured as ROA is about 2% and that measured in terms of ROE is about 16%. 
Table 2: A descriptive statistics table 
 
The trend of capital ratios has been up and down for the period of the study. Graph 1 below shows that 
between 2009 and 2011 the level of bank assets has been on a decline side from 23.7% to almost 15% but the 
ratio picked up again to around 18% and remained fairly around this figure until 2014 
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Graph 1: Trend of Bank Capital Ratios for 2009-2014 
On the other hand the average bank credit risk measured by net loans-to- total assets has been 
increasing consecutively since 2010-2013 and then dropped in 2014  as presented in graph 2. From the two 
graphs we can see that the fall in capital ratio from 2009-2011 may have resulted in the increase in credit risk in 
2010-2013. 
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Graph 2: Trend of Bank credit risk for 2009-2014 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
Before estimating our systems of simultaneous equation we decided to make a decision of checking the 
consistence of a set of estimates obtained by least squares. According to Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) an 
augmented regression test (DWH test) is appropriate for this purpose. Here we included the residuals of each 
endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the original 
model. So we first perform a regression:  CARit = c0 +c1*BSZit + c2*ROAit + c3*ROEit + c4*PRESit + c5*CRSKit 
+a6*INFLit + a7*GDPit +e3it   and the regression results presented in table 3 below. 
Table 3: Regression of original model 
After that we got residuals CARit_res, and then performed an augmented regression; RSKit = d0 + 
d1*CARit + d2*CARit_res, +e4it  to test the endogeneity between capital and risk as presented in table 2:  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.22, 2016 
 
116 
Table 2: Testing Endogeneity 
  
Because d2 in the augmented regression is significantly different from zero, then OLS is inconsistent 
since error terms of capital equation and risk equations correlate with independent variables of each equation. 
The endogeneity of the both capital and risk equations is take care by two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
methodology which ensures consistent parameter estimates as presented in table 3 
 
5.3 Regression Results 
The results presented in table 4 shows that; banks’ capital ratio in Tanzanian Large commercial banks is directly 
related to the bank risk- taking. The table shows that the positive relationship between capital and risk is 
statistically significant at statistically significant at 5% significant level. This shows that as the level of banks’ 
risk increases bank managers tend to increase the bank capital ratios so as to protect a bank from violating the 
regulatory minimum capital requirements. A positive association between risk and capital is not a surprise as 
such kind of relationship holds in banks with average capital ratios in excess of the regulatory minimum capital 
requirement as in our case where the average banks capital ratio is 12.6% while the regulatory minimum 
required by BOT is 12.5%. Other studies with similar results on risk-capital nexus are Aggrawal and Jacques 
(2001), Rime (2001) & Shrieves and Dahl (2003). 
Another interesting result is the relationship between regulatory pressure (a variable which take a value 
of 1 if a bank meets regulatory minimum capital requirement and 0 otherwise.) and capital as well as risk. Table 
4 shows that regulatory pressure has a positive and statistically significant relationship with capital at 1% 
significant level but this variable has no significant relationship with bank risk. This results show that, in the 
capital equation, banks whose capital ratio comes closer to minimum requirements increase the proportion of 
risk-based assets in their portfolio unlikely in the risk equation where banks approaching the minimum capital 
requirements do not either increase or decrease the share of risk-based assets. This result is similar to the one 
presented by Rime, (2001)  
The positive impact of regulatory pressure on bank capital shows that Tanzanians larger commercial 
banks approaching the minimum capital requirements are inclined to improve their capital base so as to 
circumvent the penalties resulted from violation of the legal requirements of keeping minimum capital. This 
finding is in line with capital buffer theory previously discussed  which envisages that due to a worry to incur 
costs associated with the violation of capital requirements bank approaching the regulatory minimum capital 
ratio may increase capital and reduce risk. 
Further results from table 4 shows a positive and significant association between profitability measured 
by Returns on Asset (ROA) consistent to other studies such as Alsbbagh (2004) and negative relationship 
between Capital and Return on Equity (ROE) similar to Bokhari and Ali (2009); Büyüksalvar and Abdioğlu 
(2011). Both relationships are statistically significant at 1% significant level. The coefficient attached to ROA 
shows that as one unit of in profitability increases bank capital increases by 3.99 units units. Likewise, a unit 
increase in profitability measured by ROE reduces the banks’ capital by 0.46 units. A positive relationship 
between banks’ earnings and banks’ capital implies that, as the profitability of banks increases they retain more 
earnings to increase the level of their capital.  On the other hand, GDP growth has negative impact on capital but 
positive on risk and inflation has a positive impact on both capital and risk but these relationships are statistically 
insignificant.  
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Table 4: Two-Stage Least Square Regression Results 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The motive of this study was to examine the relationship between capital and risk-taking behavior of Tanzanian 
commercial banks during the period 2009-2014 using the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) method of estimation. 
The empirical findings reveal a direct relationship between capital ratios and bank risk-taking behavior. This 
implies that as the level of banks’ risk increases bank managers tend to increase the bank capital ratios so as to 
prevent banks from violating the regulatory minimum. This finding is consistent with the fact that banks whose 
capital ratio is approaching minimum regulatory capital requirement level would tend to increase their risk level 
so as to take advantage of possible proceeds that the banks could use to improve and strengthen their capital base.  
Furthermore, the study found that regulatory pressure has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with bank capital but has no significant relationship with bank risk-taking. The positive impact of 
regulatory pressure on bank capital shows that Tanzanians larger commercial banks approaching the minimum 
capital requirements are inclined to improve their capital base so as to circumvent the penalties resulted from 
violation of the legal requirements of keeping minimum capital, the results consistent with capital buffer theory. 
The study also found a positive and significant association between profitability and bank capital. A 
positive relationship between banks’ earnings and banks’ capital shows that as the profitability of banks 
increases they retain more earnings to raise the level of their capital. Hence, it is concluded that banks’ 
improvement in profitability helps to increase their capital ratios so as to protect them from failure when they 
take additional risks.  
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